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Abstract
Categorization is a fundamental function of minds, with wide ranging
implications for the rest of the cognitive system. In humans, categories
are shared and communicated between minds, thus requiring explanations
at the population level. In this paper, we discuss the current state of
research on the cultural evolution of categorization. We begin by delin-
eating key properties of categories in need of evolutionary explanation.
We then review computational modeling and laboratory studies of cate-
gory evolution, including their major insights and limitations. Finally, we
discuss remaining challenges for understanding the cultural evolution of
categorization.
1 Introduction
Categorization is a core cognitive skill, with wide-ranging implications for
the rest of the cognitive system. Categories allow us to parse our inter-
actions with the world, and divide complex and otherwise chaotic stimuli
into discrete kinds. Thus, an individual furry moving thing becomes an
instance of the category cat, which in turn allows us to reason that it
would be a bad idea to tug on its tail. In such instances of categoriza-
tion, perceptual information is compressed and classified on the basis of
its relationship to some other previously perceived or conceived category,
contextualizing the new stimulus by virtue of similarity or analogy to
contexts stored in memory (French, 1995; Hofstadter and Sander, 2013).
Novel properties of the present stimuli can be used to adjust or expand
existing categories as well as to create new categories.
Although categorization is widely studied in humans, it is a cognitive
ability that is necessarily widespread across the animal kingdom, since
adaptive decision making is enhanced for those individuals who can best
make sense of the world around them. A fascinating example comes from
the California ground squirrel, who in the presence of predatory snakes
often exhibit “tail flagging,” in which the squirrel rears up and waves its
tail vigorously (Rundus et al., 2007). This prompts the snake to shift its
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own behavior from predatory to defensive. Ground squirrels not only dis-
tinguish snakes from other stimuli, but also notice the difference between
rattlesnakes, which are sensitive to infrared signals, and gopher snakes,
which are not. In the presence of the former but not the latter predator,
ground squirrels will pump blood into their tails while flagging, a costly
behavior that is detectable by rattlesnakes but not gopher snakes.
However, a major consideration for the study of categorization in hu-
mans is that humans are profoundly cultural creatures. We show unusu-
ally high levels of cooperation and communication, at a degree of com-
plexity that is not seen in other species. Some non-human species are
social, and are able to communicate information in ways that reflect the
use of elementary “cultural categories.” The alarm call system used by
vervet monkeys (Seyfarth et al., 1980) is a well-known example. Never-
theless, few if any non-human species have cumulative culture, in which
technological and institutional forms can build on innovations from prior
or concurrent generations (Boyd and Richerson, 1996; Tennie et al., 2009;
Legare, 2017). For we humans, culture pervades cognitive and social expe-
rience, and thus the cultural nature of our categories is more entrenched.
We use categories for talking amongst ourselves about the world, and also
for talking about ourselves and others. Communication and coordination
in humans require convergence on shared concepts that facilitate com-
mon goals, joint attention, and consistent norms and institutions (Chwe,
2001; Clark, 1996; Skyrms, 2004; Tomasello, 2009; Smaldino, 2014). Our
categories must therefore not only be internally consistent; they must be
culturally consistent.
Language is often seen as a vehicle for this kind of parcellation of a
complex and variegated world. Categorical terms like “cat” are a big
part of the lexicon of each individual language. Different languages carve
up the world in different manners, with some stunning differences in do-
mains such as spatial categories (Levinson and Brown, 1994; Majid et al.,
2004), color (Kay et al., 2009), and kinship (Kemp and Regier, 2012).
For this reason, language is a critical human skill, subject to functional
considerations–such as how a set of semantic categories can help a lin-
guistic community navigate and survive in its environment. Indeed, lan-
guage is widely discussed in the realms of biological and cultural evolution
(Christiansen and Kirby, 2003; Fitch, 2010; Hurford, 2012). Categoriza-
tion, surprisingly, is less often integrated in evolutionary questions, despite
its core cognitive significance.
Although the cultural features of categories may ultimately manifest in
language, there are many important social domains for which the cultural
aspects of categorization are paramount. Some examples include:
• Social identity. Humans readily classify people into groups and roles
that facilitate decision making related to interaction. Such categories
are imperative for coordination and assortment in cooperative and
competitive tasks (Smaldino, 2018), including evaluating potential
mates (Miller and Todd, 1998).
• Morality. Categorizing behaviors as moral, ethical, or legal facili-
tates a convergence on norms that is necessary for cultural cohesion
(Curry, 2016).
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• Emotion. Interpretations of emotional signals are often bound to
context and the culturally appropriate expressions for those contexts
(Barrett et al., 2007).
• Personality. The way we describe others relies on finding regu-
larities among behaviors and contexts that are useful for predic-
tion, and these regularities are at least partly culturally determined
(Gurven et al., 2013; Lukaszewski et al., 2017).
Reliance on the categories in the preceding list did not arise sponta-
neously with the emergence large brains during the course of our evolution.
Nor did they emerge through individual learning processes as a result of
a shared environment. Many salient categories in human cultures must
necessarily arise through cultural processes. And because cultures last far
longer than individual lifespans and change through well studied mecha-
nisms (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Turchin, 2003; Mesoudi, 2011), many
properties of human categories and categorization require explanations in
terms of cultural evolution.
In this paper, we discuss the current state of research in understand-
ing the cultural evolution of categorization. We begin by delineating key
properties of categories in need of evolutionary explanation. We then
review computational modeling and laboratory studies of category evo-
lution, including major insights and limitations. Most of the approaches
that we review focus on the cultural evolution of category terms and their
relationship to the environment. Because of this focus on category terms,
prior studies also reflect categorization itself. We will also argue that un-
derstanding category systems as the locus of evolutionary dynamics may
inform the study of language evolution in interesting ways. More broadly,
taking categorization as central may help to integrate various aspects of
the debate on cognitive evolution. We will conclude with some remaining
challenges for understanding the cultural evolution of categorization.
2 Features of Categories and Concepts
For the purpose of evaluating the approaches to the evolution of cate-
gories, it is useful to review some of the relevant features of categoriza-
tion, concepts and their relationship to language. Because of how vast
the field of research in concepts and categories is, we will focus on fea-
tures most relevant to our present goal. Reviews on categorization abound
(for authoritative reviews see Murphy (2004); Cohen and Lefebvre (2005);
Pothos and Wills (2011)), but some of its core properties can be summa-
rized succinctly.
Terminologically, we use the term “concept” to refer to the psycho-
logical representation of a category, which allows for the categorization of
stimuli. We use the terms “categories” or “categorical structure” to refer
to the partitions of the world that are relatively stable and distributed
widely in a population (Ross and Tidwell, 2010). The latter is encoded in
the population’s categorical language, shared knowledge structure, and in-
stitutions. Categories and concepts are not independent—shared cultural
categories may influence individuals’ concepts (Ross et al., 2003), and of
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course shared cultural categories depend on the internalized concepts of
the constituent individuals . Some aspects of our shared categorical struc-
ture are even subject to persistent deliberate change, as with legal or sci-
entific categories. Thus, although our focus will be on culturally shared
categories, we cannot avoid some discussion of concepts at the level of
individuals.
Categorical boundaries are fuzzy. One classical model of categories
treats them as a set necessary and sufficient features that uniquely define
the set of all their members (Murphy, 2004). Empirical psychology has
shown this classical thesis to be too simplistic. In their well-known behav-
ioral experiments, Rosch and Mervis (1975) showed that categorization is
affected by prototyping effects. Subjects are able to rank members of a
category according to the extent to which they are representative of the
category. Most people recognize that apples are better exemplars of fruits
than tomatoes. It is hard for the classical view to explain this without
further modifications (see Medin & Smith 1984), as apples and tomatoes
would be members of the same set by virtue of the very same features.
Thus, categorical boundaries are fuzzy in the sense that membership in a
category may be relative rather than absolute.
A related sense in which categories are fuzzy is that they don’t appear
to have clear-cut boundaries (Rosch, 1978). Consider the arguments that
might ensue when classifying spiders or fish as pets or non-pets. Ambi-
guity in category membership can arise even for seemingly clear-cut cases
like whether a number is odd or even (Armstrong et al., 1983). Lupyan
(2017) provides another example using the case of “triangle.” Despite its
precise, mathematical definition, reasoning about triangles appears to be
influenced by secondary descriptors and contexts. This work shows that
even highly abstract and formal concepts can have fuzzy boundaries, and
points to the role that language plays in making conceptual boundaries
more precise.
All categorical terms, at least to some degree, serve to reduce the di-
mensionality of information. Yet complex stimuli can be decomposed in
many different ways. How then should the categories that carve up the
world be organized? A version of this question was famously given by
Quine (1960), writing at a time that preceded the tidal wave of experi-
mental psychology on categories. If you heard the word “gavagai” in an
unknown language, but knew the word was used in the context of a rab-
bit, you still face considerable challenges of categorization. You would not
automatically know if it referred to its color, to the whole rabbit, to a part
of the rabbit, or to a broader context like, say, rabbit-on-Tuesday. This
does not mean, however, that categories are arbitrary or unconstrained;
it just points that there is nothing in the stimuli that necessarily suggest
a specific way of categorizing, and that our specific set of categories must
have developed through some processes in addition to the individual per-
ceiving and interacting with his or her world. Culture, and particularly
language, seems to be the main vehicle for the creation of precise cate-
gories by a population, and for the acquisition of less fuzzy concepts by
individuals.
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Concepts are learned. Although it has been argued that some concepts
are innate (Carey, 2009; Wellman and Gelman, 1992), the vast majority
of the categories we employ on a day-to-day basis are learned. Labo-
ratory studies have shown that new concepts can be learned by inter-
acting with objects in novel ways (Markman and Ross, 2003), through
generalization of the features of their members (Erickson and Kruschke,
1998), or by association (Colunga and Smith, 2005). Indeed, decades of
experiments have shown that categories can be taught (Rosch and Mervis,
1975; Medin and Schaffer, 1978). Concepts can be acquired, forgotten, or
changed, and can shrink or expand over the course of a lifetime. As a crit-
ical example, the vast array of technological artifacts that surround most
modern humans have only recently emerged in our history; and some cat-
egories that were prominent in the past have fallen out of use. Before the
agricultural revolution of 11 thousand years ago, humans lived in predom-
inantly egalitarian societies without extensive hierarchy, division of labor,
and wealth of socioeconomic niches that structure lives in contemporary
industrialized societies (Boehm, 2009; Turchin, 2015). Thus, not only con-
cepts, but also shared categorical structure can emerge and change over
the history of a population.
Categories and concepts are flexible, and goal-oriented. Human
concepts have several semantic properties different from those used by
non-human animals. Specifically, although most animals are capable of
basic categorizing and signaling (Fedurek and Slocombe, 2011), animal
calls are typically only functionally referential in that they are not flexible
and do not seem to respond to generalized discretization of stimuli.1 In
contrast, human categorical structure not only draws boundaries between
objects, features of objects, processes, etc., but can be used to refer to
these categories flexibly and combinatorially. Thus, humans are able to
say that although apes, dogs and swordfish are all part of the category
animals, they have a vast set of features that also make each of them
distinct, from their form to their habitat. A dog can be an animal, a pet,
a friend, a police officer, or “something soft.”This property of flexibility
makes categorical terms deeply transformative of human intelligence.
Some have argued that the flexibility and fluidity of categorization is
critically important to human creativity and ought to be given more the-
oretical attention, especially in view of the role of concepts in achieving
particular goals. Schemas, for example, are categories for recurrent sce-
narios that give structure to decision making (Smaldino and Richerson,
2012). Barsalou (1983) discussed the importance of goal-oriented “ad hoc
categories,” which include items such as “what to sell at a garage sale”
or “what to take out of the house in case of a fire.” Any collective action
leading to social change requires building new schemas and ad hoc cate-
gories, which in turn shape social life. Flexible, goal-oriented categories
are therefore often key players in cultural evolution.
Categories and concepts are interwoven with our words for them.
Classically, the relationship between concepts and their linguistic labels
1Although see Fischer (1998) and Seyfarth and Cheney (2017) for some opposing views.
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has been seen as one in which pre-existing mental representations are as-
sociated with an arbitrary word (Lupyan, 2012). However, use of con-
cepts is deeply affected by the presence of linguistic labels, over and
above the general influence of language on cognition (Lupyan and Bergen,
2016). Categories that are labeled are easier to learn, and there is evi-
dence that concepts activated via linguistic labels are intrinsically different
from seemingly identical concepts activated nonverbally (Lupyan, 2012;
Lupyan and Casasanto, 2015; Sufill et al., 2016).
Language evolves, in part from pressures to maximize production and
understanding, but also in tandem with the categories that shape human
life (Kirby, 2017; Lupyan and Dale, 2016). If humans are the talking ape,
then we cannot understand ourselves without understanding language.
And because language is interwoven with the categories it uses to com-
municate, we must understand how those categories evolve.
Categorization in humans is complex.
No doubt there are biological and ecological pressures that favor the
development of particular categories that are (i) easy to learn and use
and (ii) handy in certain environments. Considering the multitude of
objects and ecosystems humans face, though, it is possible to see what
can be meant by the cultural evolution of categorization. In evolutionary
terms, categorization has a complex fitness landscape. Categorization
schemes may emerge and evolve to handle new territories, or to conquer
more effectively one that is already at hand. This must happen rapidly,
because the social and ecological environments that require categorization
can change must more rapidly than genes can adapt. The evolution of
categories must therefore be cultural in nature, both for adaptive purposes
and for those of social coordination.
In the remainder of the paper we will review and evaluate a number
of modeling and experimental approaches that have been used to study
the cultural evolution of categorization.
3 Computational models
Cultural evolutionary processes occur over large spans of space and time,
involving complex interactions that are difficult to study directly. Com-
putational models are important tools for understanding such systems
(Smaldino, 2017). Due both to its centrality in cognitive processing and
its utility in commercial software, computational models of categorization
are widespread. Indeed, categorization is the primary function of many
artificial neural networks since seminal work by Rumelhart et al. (1987),
a function which extends to other machine-learning techniques such as
K-means clustering (Jain, 2010). Our focus, however is on the cultural
evolution of categorization. Far less work has been done on this front.
This review is intended to be representative, rather than exhaustive, of
the prior modeling work on the social or cultural evolution of categories.
We have chosen to emphasize certain works because they focus specifically
on the dynamics of categorical structure and concepts, be it in the same
population or over several generations.
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Cangelosi and Parisi (1998) studied a simple model in which agents
must forage for mushrooms, and learn to distinguish between two types:
edible and poisonous. In some versions of their model, agents can com-
municate their findings to other agents, who learn to recognize signals
representing edible or poisonous and subsequently inform their decisions
to advance or withdraw from the location. The categories in this model
are provided exogenously, so nothing is really learned about the evolution
of categories per se. However, this study nicely illustrates the idea that the
social information can have important consequences for categories. Ac-
tively categorizing stimuli is costly and requires time and proximity. Com-
municating categories can reduce those costs and increase fitness. This
model is noteworthy in that categorization serves a clear fitness-enhancing
behavior: finding food and avoiding harm. Moreover, in the populations of
categorizers that were allowed to communicate without a pre-established
vocabulary, a shared structure of categorical terms emerged. Thus, de-
spite its simplicity, this model embraces the goal-oriented and functional
nature of categories in a population, and shows how this aspect could be
one of the engines driving the creation of categorical structure. As we
shall see, most other models ignore such concerns. A tacit assumption of
this and other models is that all individuals in the population are coop-
erative, with aligned interests (e.g., individuals don’t want others to be
poisoned).
Most models of the evolution of categories focus on the evolution and
emergence of color concepts (Steels et al., 2005; Dowman, 2007; Komarova et al.,
2007; Puglisi et al., 2008; Baronchelli et al., 2010; Gong, 2010; Gong et al.,
2012). Color categories are a useful case study for at least two reasons.
First, there are decades of empirical research on how humans parse colors
into categories, including systematic studies of cultural and linguistic dif-
ferences and universals (Kay and Maffi, 1999; Kay et al., 2009). Second,
color presents a unidimensional, continuously varying stimuli, so that cat-
egories can be straightforwardly modeled as discrete intervals on a finite
line segment (although some models have used a circle to model colors;
Dowman (2007); Komarova et al. (2007)). This is also a limitation of
these models in terms of generalizability to other category structures, as
we will discuss in a later section.
Most if not all of these models take as their foundation a paradigm
that has come to be known as the Category Game. The name was first
introduced by Puglisi et al. (2008), though it is structurally very similar
to paradigms used in earlier papers (e.g. Steels et al. (2005); Dowman
(2007); Komarova et al. (2007)). Before going further, let us contrast this
game with the more widely known Signaling Game, first introduced by
Lewis (1969) and analyzed extensively by Skyrms (2010) and others. The
Signaling Game involves two players: the signaler and the receiver. In its
simplest version, the world can be in one of two states. The signaler knows
the state of the world, and wants to communicate this to the receiver using
one of two signals. The receiver then selects one of two actions, each
of which is most appropriate for a particular state of the world. If the
receiver selects the appropriate action, both the receiver and the signaler
are rewarded. The signals are not inherently meaningful. Rather, it is
the task of the individuals to converge on a convention that a particular
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signals indicates a particular state of the world. It is critical that both the
states of the world (the categories) and the signals (the category labels)
are fixed, finite sets of equal size.
In the Category Game model, neither the states of the world (e.g.,
the color categories) nor the signals (e.g., the color names) are fixed.
Instead there is a population of individuals, each of whom keeps a set
of labels corresponding to intervals on a color line, such that multiple
labels can exist for a given interval. When an interaction occurs, one
individual is randomly chosen to be the speaker and the other to be the
hearer. The speaker is presented with a set of two or more color swatches,
which she must discriminate. She chooses one and names it using either
her pre-existing category name or a new name invented to distinguish
it from another presented swatch. The hearer then points to the color
swatch to which he thinks the color name corresponds. If the hearer fails
to correctly identify the correct swatch, he adds the transmitted word
to his category discriminating the color interval in question. If there is
agreement, the game is a “success,” and both individuals delete from
their memories all of the words except the one transmitted from their
inventories of words corresponding to the color category in question. The
result is generally some sort of population-level consensus on category
boundaries and corresponding labels.
In their extensive study, Steels et al. (2005) modeled each individual
with a complex cognitive architecture. Perceptual categorization occurred
with an adaptive feedforward neural network, and naming occurred with
an associative memory network. Category convergence could occur both
through genetic evolution, individual learning, or learning constrained by
culture (the need to coordinate on color names). In other words, they were
able to test “nativist,” “empiricist” (or “evoked culture”), and “cultur-
ist” views on category emergence. They showed that individualist learn-
ing (empiricism) resulted in individuals who each had internal categories,
but there was not strong coherence among individuals with a popula-
tion, nor were categories shared across populations. Genetic evolution
(nativism) resulted in complete 100% cohesion of categories within popu-
lations, which were not shared across populations. Finally, learning with
language led to strong (but not complete) coherence within populations.
This is claimed to be somewhat more realistic than the other transmission
models both in the extent of the category coherence and in the time frame
for that coherence to emerge. In this sense, this model explores the re-
lationship between category learning and communication, and highlights
the interaction between individual acquisition of concepts and a culturally
evolving shared categorical structure.
Puglisi et al. (2008) greatly simplified the model of Steels et al. (2005).
Here, agents perceived color information as a single number and repre-
sented category information as explicit look-up tables. They similarly
found the emergence of consistent color categories. They also performed
computational experiments with different distributions of colors and showed
that linguistic categories were more refined in regions where stimuli are
more frequent, illustrating how the environment may influence the cate-
gorization process. More generally, they found a deviation between many
perceptual categories (many color intervals stored in memory) and far
8
fewer linguistic categories. However, this result is likely an artifact of the
model assumption that allows for linguistic labels to be eliminated, while
there is no mechanisms to eliminate perceptual categories. Considering
the evidence for the influence of categorical terms on perceptual cate-
gories, it would be reasonable to extend this model to include a process
through which perceptual categories can change, for example, when their
categorical terms merge or when they fall out of use due to the statistical
structure of the environment. Nevertheless, the model is valuable in that
it shows how a cultural categorical structure can emerge only constrained
by the environment and the need to coordinate with others.
Baronchelli et al. (2010) extended this work to demonstrate that the
model could generate patterns of color categories consistent with empir-
ical data from the World Color Survey (Kay et al., 2009), a quantitative
database of the different ways that over a hundred languages around the
world categorize color. In particular, running their model multiple times
to represent different cultures, they showed that the resulting dispersion
of language terms shared some statistical properties with the empirical
data.
Another extension explores the effects of population structure. Gong
and colleagues (Gong, 2010; Gong et al., 2012) modeled the Category
Game on populations of agents in structured social networks, in contrast
with the well-mixed populations used in previous studies. To do this,
they introduced two new metrics: overlap, the average degree of align-
ment of linguistic categories among individuals (so that a high value in-
dicates individuals tend to develop categories having similar boundaries),
and understanding rate, the percentage of successful category games in
all pairs of individuals (so that a high value indicates that individuals
tend to use identical labels to describe stimuli with similar boundaries).
Gong et al. (2012) had agents play the Category Game on several social
network structures: well-mixed, ring, 2-D lattice, small-world, scale-free,
and star networks. They found that network structure had large effects
on population outcomes. Networks with high average path lengths (such
as ring and 2-D lattices) had substantially lower understanding rates and
linguistic overlap compared with other network structures. This result
was amplified for larger population sizes. Both extensions to the model
illustrate a further point about the cultural evolution of categorical struc-
ture: it responds to specific features of the environment. The structure
of a population and the environment with which it interacts affect the
particular categories that a population adopts.
4 Experimental studies
A related avenue for the exploration of this topic is experimental work.
Experiments can be considered as models too, as they are abstract rep-
resentations of a larger class of social contexts and behavioral opportu-
nities (Galantucci and Garrod, 2011; Schank et al., 2014; Smaldino et al.,
2015). Paradigms used in behavioral experiments are indirectly used to
understand different aspects of real evolutionary dynamics. They have
several limitations for achieving this goal; most notably, they take place
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over minutes rather than generations. However, their strength relies on
their ability to embed fully realized humans into artificial scenarios. This
can be thought of as analogous to the advantages in artificial intelligence
research for studying embodied robots instead of simulations: instead of
using a simplistic model of the environment, researchers can use the real
thing (Brooks, 1991). In this case, using real humans instead of compu-
tational agents provides data on the kind of cognitive processing humans
actually do, even if the environmental setting and evolutionary dynamics
are contrived.
A major experimental paradigm for studying cultural evolution in the
laboratory is iterated learning, in which participants perform a task and
their responses are presented as stimuli for subsequent participants. In the
past, these kinds of experiments have been used to study the evolution of
language (Kirby et al., 2008; Griffiths and Kalish, 2007; Galantucci and Garrod,
2011; Scott-Phillips and Kirby, 2010). However, they have also been used
to study specific aspects of categorical learning and category term cre-
ation. As with our discussion of computational models, our discussion of
these studies is meant to be representative rather than exhaustive.
Perfors and Navarro (2014) showed that varying the structure of pre-
sented stimuli can affect the specific categorical structure of the language
that emerges to refer to them. In their study, they presented squares
of different sizes and colors to participants paired with randomly gener-
ated strings. Each participant was trained in the link between string and
square, and then was asked to type the name of unseen squares. The
patterns that emerged over time simulated the evolution of a referential
linguistic system, and the categories that go along with it. What makes
this experiment relevant for this paper is that the authors subjected the
participants to the study in three different conditions: an unmodified one;
one in which the size of the stimuli varied more discontinuously; and one
in which the color of the stimuli varied more discontinuously. This aspect
of the experiment simulates differently structured worlds which present
different pressures to what kind of categorical system should be created.
As predicted, the languages resulting from the modified conditions
had considerable differences. The categories of the emerging languages
tended to divide the squares guided by the modified property. Moreover,
this effect was gradual over the generations of the chains of participants.
Thus, the final categorization patterns were the end result of generations
of unknowing cultural evolution interacting with individual learning of
concepts.
A recent study by Carr et al. (2017) provides further insight into this
process. Their explicit goal was to analyze how chains of participants
create categorical terms when not provided with an already categorized
world at the beginning of the experiment. As inputs, they created ran-
domly generated triangles with varying edge length. This had the ad-
vantage of being a continuous stimulus space, as there is a theoretically
infinite number of triangles that can be generated as mid-points between
two other triangles. Similarly to the experiment by Perfors and Navarro
(2014) described before, the first generation of participants was trained
on a random selection of triangles, accompanied by a randomly gener-
ated string. Participants were then asked to generate labels for unseen
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randomly generated triangles. Starting from the second generation, the
training set was the set of triangle-label pairings generated by the person
before them in the chain.
Their first study found that, over successive generations, the num-
ber of words present in the languages decreased, as did the transmission
errors from one generation to the next. But, more importantly for the
goal of this paper, categorical structure sharply increased in most of the
chains. This structure was measured as the dissimilarity between pairs of
strings as they relate to the similarity of the triangles to which they refer
(Carr et al., 2017). Over time, similar triangles were grouped together
by similar, if not identical, words. This result illustrates how the emer-
gence of categorization can partition a continuous space over time through
the interaction of individual category learning and cultural transmission.
Furthermore, the closeness between the similarity of the stimuli and the
terms used sheds light on the link between categorical terms and the use of
concepts to categorize objects according to their similarity or dissimilarity.
Though purposefully specific in their scope, both of these experiments
reveal the promise of using the iterated learning paradigm to study the
evolution of categorization. However, in comparison with the models,
these experimental designs tend to omit an essential part of cultural evo-
lution: horizontal transmission. Each generation is simplified as only one
person, eliminating the effects that some of the models highlight, such
as social coordination. This may facilitate implementation of the design,
and subsequent data analysis, but going beyond this simplification is an
important next step (e.g., Fay et al., 2010). Moreover, the experiments
also omit the pragmatic dimension of category use in connection to the
emergence of categorical terms. Although more sophisticated than the
tasks used in the models, the experimental tasks were still done only for
their own sake, with no independent goal upon which to measure how
categorization and linguistic labels modified performance over time. En-
hancing such deliberate pragmatic dimensions of the categorization tasks
would improve the match to the goal-oriented features of categories we
described earlier.
5 Evaluation of Existing Research
The existing research has provided a crucial foundation for understanding
the cultural evolution of categorization and of categories. Nevertheless,
we see several promising new paths that may be taken by future research
to expand our understanding of this underexplored issue.
First, models and experiments often lack a fundamental function for
the categories that emerge. Instead, they are often passive mappings of
stimuli. In contrast, the functional quality of natural categories is active,
not passive. They reflect things we do to objects, or things that objects
might do to us. For this reason, the structure and shape of categories
may depend fundamentally on interactive consequences with the world.
The lack of function is exemplified by the discrimination task used in the
Category Game and related models, which relies solely on coordination
of conventions. While coordination is probably a necessary feature for
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socially shared categories, it is not sufficient in many if not most cases.
Second, the cultural evolution of categorization must take into ac-
count cultural differences. Different cultures exist in diverse ecological
settings and have diverse cultural norms that are already known to fa-
cilitate crucial differences in cognitive processing (Nisbett et al., 2001;
Nisbett and Miyamoto, 2005; Henrich et al., 2010; Smaldino and Richerson,
2012). The models used to study the cultural evolution and emergence of
categories require at their foundation a theory that can take those differ-
ences to bear. That said, the study of color terms discussed above it itself
promising example of such an analysis. Computational simulation and
statistical analysis of cross-cultural tendencies reveals both biological and
cultural constraints on these category schemes (Regier et al., 2007). A
similar strategy applied more broadly could strengthen the link between
cross-cultural category variation and processes of category evolution. This
would permit researchers not only to study how categories emerge, but
also to explain particular regimes of variation in categories across cultures
(e.g., Ross et al., 2003).
Finally, the processes of cultural transmission studied are limited.
Cultural evolutionists have long studied the important distinctions be-
tween information that is transmitted vertically (from parent to offspring),
obliquely (from older non-parent to member of the next generation), and
horizontally (between members of the same generation) (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman,
1981; Kline et al., 2013). Most models ignore intergenerational evolution,
and so consider only horizontal transmission. Meanwhile, most exper-
iments have only considered linear transmission chains that are meant
to approximate vertical transmission. Future work might integrate hor-
izontal, vertical, and oblique transmission to more realistically capture
potentially critical aspects of how categories emerge. A recent study of
language evolution illustrates how this may be possible in experimental
studies. Fay et al. (2010) developed a laboratory task that could inde-
pendently manipulate vertical vs. horizontal transmission. They tend
to find that horizontal transmission has a surprising impact on the com-
municability of emergent forms in a language. This kind of design could
be adapted for the evolution of category structure. Along these lines, a
recent review byMiton and Charbonneau (2018) has suggested several ad-
ditional improvements to cultural transmission experiments, highlighting
that horizontal transmission over short time periods may not accurately
model vertical transmission over generations.
Thinking about categories forces us to consider the complexity inher-
ent both out in the world and in our minds. Sperber (1996) and others
have noted that information transmission is often not well characterized
by imitation. Rather, minds reconstruct information based on what they
already know, including their other preexisting categories. Thus, the land-
scape of existing categories is likely to influence future categorization.
Evolutionary biologists have studied dynamics like this under the banner
of niche construction (Odling-Smee et al., 2003), and numerous scholars
have extended this work to human cultural evolution (Ihara and Feldman,
2004; Kendal, 2011; Laland et al., 2000; Laland and O’Brien, 2011). Such
work takes note of how individuals actively modify their environments to
create new selection pressures, as well as how they inherit the environ-
12
mental changes made by those who came before them. As such, niche
construction may be a useful paradigm for modeling the evolution of cat-
egories. Looking outward, categories also emerge through complex social
processes involving emergent group structures and iterative interaction
over the lifespan (Smaldino, 2014). Understanding these emergent pro-
cesses is paramount.
6 Conclusion
Previous research has demonstrated that repeated interactions can gener-
ate shared categories among members of a population, and that chains of
transmission can further shape the landscape of available categories. This
research has helped us to understand many of the processes involved in
the evolution of categories. An examination of the research as a whole,
however, has demonstrated that much work remains for understanding
the cultural evolution of categorization. Many of the features of cate-
gories described in Section 2 of this paper remain unexplained. Models,
be they computational or experimental, are only as good as their assump-
tions. We have work to do to bring the model assumptions up to speed
with what is known about both cognition and cultural transmission.
Categorization is a fundamental function of minds, and a major topic
of research in cognitive science. In humans, however, categories are shared
and communicated between minds, thus requiring an additional level of ex-
planation: the population level. Recently, Cecelia Heyes (2018) has made
the compelling argument that the fields of cognitive science and cultural
evolution have much to offer one another. The problem of understanding
the cultural evolution of categorization is perhaps the ideal opportunity
for these two fields to make deep contributions and for new synergies to
emerge.
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